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A Theory Appendix
A.1 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1.
To avoid a lengthy taxonomy of cases, the analysis focuses on interior solutions. This is without loss
of generality as there always exists a rescaling of parameters D and ∆ such that all assumptions are
verified and an interior solution exists. We consider the three scenarios described in the main text.
For notational simplicity, we also assume buyers pay a per period interest rate of 1/δ when paying
at the end of the month. This eliminates a trade credit motive and delivers a more transparent
algebra without affecting any of the results.
A Liquid Saving Technology: Consider the case of a producer who, in a given month, must
save on her own using the liquid saving technology. In t = 2, the producer decides to save δD and
purchase the indivisible good in t = 3, rather than consuming, if v+s1−δD+βδ∆ ≥ v+s1, where s1
is the amount the producer saved in t = 1. The inequality holds if β ≥ D∆ ≡ β1. In addition, since
v/δ < D, self 1 must also save sP1 = δ
2(D−v/δ). She chooses to do so if v−sP1 +βδ2∆ ≥ v(1+βδ),
or β ≥ D∆ − vδ∆ ≡ β˜ < β1.
Infrequent Payments: Consider now the case in which the buyer pays a price per liter p at
the end of the month (t = 3). Self 2 will save s∗2 = δ(D − px1/δ) for the indivisible good if
v− ((D− px1)/δ) + βδ∆ > v or x1 ≥ δ
2(D−β∆)
p ≡ x∗1. In turn, self 1 will be willing to provide this
minimum amount of illiquid savings to self 2 if (1− x∗1)v + βδ((v − s∗2) + δ∆) ≥ (1 + βδ)v, which
holds if p ≥ v D−β∆β∆(1−β) ≡ p2. The infrequent payment helps if the buyer can make non-negative
profits, i.e., p ≤ v. Setting p = v yields β ≥ 1−
√
∆−D
∆ ≡ β2. Simple algebra shows that β2 < β1.
When β ∈ [β2, β1) producers can buy the indivisible good if the large buyer provides infrequent
payments but not by saving on their own. Note that the threshold β2 corresponds to the case
in which producers sell at v and save in a commitment saving account with large withdraw fees
before t = 3.
Infrequent Payments with a Relational Buyer: As discussed in the paper, a buyer who offers
infrequent payments can further help producers save by threatening to punish them if they fail
to sell (and thus to save) on a regular basis. We focus on the stationary relational contract that
maximizes the buyer profits subject to incentive constraints for the producer. In the resulting
relational contract the large buyer sets a price p for deliveries and requires the producer to sell
x1 and x2 in period 1 and 2 respectively, such that p(x1/δ
2 + x2/δ) = D. If the producer ever
deviates, the large buyer will never accept deliveries from that producer in the future.
Self 2 sells to the large buyer if v(1−x∗∗2 )+βδ
(
∆ + δV ∆
) ≥ v+βδ (δV 0) , where x∗∗2 = δ(Dp −x1δ2 ),
V ∆ = (1−x1)v+δ(1−x2)v+δ
2∆
1−δ3 and V
0 = 1+δ
1−δ3 v are the continuation values when maintaining or
leaving the relation, respectively. The inequality holds if x1 ≥ δ2Dv(1−(1−β)δ
3)−pβ∆
pv(1−δ3) ≡ x∗∗1 . Thus,
x∗∗1 is the minimum level of (infrequent payment) sales that self 1 must make to the large buyer
to induce self 2 to sell to the large buyer, too. Self 1 will chose to sell this amount if p ≥
Dv 1+(1−β)
2δ3
(2−β)β∆ ≡ p3.
Under the assumption of perfect contract enforcement and no buyer default, the relational
contract helps producers buy the indivisible good as long as the large buyer can make zero profit
from the relationship, i.e., if p ≤ v. Setting p = v and rearranging terms yields β ≥ 1−
√
∆−D
∆−Dδ3 ≡
β3. Simple algebra establishes β3 < β2. When β ∈ [β3, β2), the producer buys the indivisible good
under the relational contract (which features both illiquid payment and punishment threat), but
not with illiquid payments alone. Even a producer with access to an illiquid saving technology
might not use it if the buyer provides illiquid payments with the additional threat of future
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punishment if the producer deviates from the plan.
Proof of Proposition 2. We now consider the case in which infrequent payments must be
self-enforcing, i.e., buyers must be given incentives to honor their promises to pay at the end of
the month. While, in principle, both the large and the small buyers can offer infrequent payments,
we characterize an equilibrium in which the large buyer sets prices such that small buyers are not
able to credibly promise infrequent payments. That is, we construct an equilibrium such as the
one described in Proposition 3. We first check that in equilibrium there are no profitable unilateral
deviations and then show that there are intermediate values of β that satisfy all the conditions.
Proposed Equilibrium: In the proposed equilibrium the large buyer first sets the price for
infrequent payments.1 The small traders decide whether to offer daily or infrequent payments and
at which price. Finally producers either accept or reject the relational contract offered by the large
buyer and make their sales and purchases decisions.
Large Buyer: The large buyer sets the price to maximize profits subject to three constraints:
i) producers must be willing to sell; ii) no other trader can credibly offer infrequent payments;
and iii) the large buyer must be credible. Generally, when such an equilibrium exists iii) cannot
be binding.
Let us now consider the large buyer’s possible deviations. Two cases must be distinguished:
case 1:) the producer’s participation constraint is binding; case 2:) the small traders’ incentive
constraint binds. In both cases the large buyer has no incentive to default on promised monthly
payments, as she would lose the future rents. In both cases she also has no incentives to lower the
price. If the producer’s participation is binding that would lower the volumes bought; if the small
trader’s incentive constraint is binding traders would then become credible at a larger price and
the buyer wouldn’t make any profit. The large buyer has thus no incentives to deviate.
Producers: In case 1 producers do not have incentives to deviate: they are indifferent between
sticking to the plan versus deviating and never being able to buy the indivisible good in the future.
In case 2 they would be made strictly worse-off by such a deviation.
Small Traders: Small traders also have no incentives to deviate. In the proposed equilibrium
they make zero profits. Given the price set by the large buyer they can’t credibly offer infrequent
payments. If they do so, they would still make zero profit.2
We have thus checked that the proposed strategy profile constitutes a subgame-perfect Nash
equilibrium in which no player has a unilateral incentive to deviate. We now check that all the
required conditions can indeed be verified for intermediate values of impatience β.
Existence: Consider a deviation in which a small buyer offers a producer infrequent payments
at price p and denote with xˆSt the resulting quantity the trader buys in period t = 1, 2. If the
producer accepts the small buyer’s offer, she is punished by the large buyer who will refuse to
purchase from her in the future. To attract the producer, then, the small buyer must offer a deal
that allows the producer to purchase the indivisible good solely from his promised low frequency
1To be precise, at the beginning of the game the large buyer posts a plan, i.e., a sequence of prices and buy-
ing policies for all future periods on- and off- the equilibrium path. As is well-known, in the optimal stationary
equilibrium of this game the two formulations are equivalent (Abreu, 1988) and we therefore avoid the unnecessary
notational complexity associated with the plan.
2The assumption that buyers either offer monthly or daily payments, but not both, rules out a deviation in
which small traders offer a contingent plan in which monthly payments are offered only to those producers that have
defaulted on the large buyer. If they could do so (or if we consider asymmetric equilibria in which some small traders
specialize in offering infrequent payments to defaulting producers) we need to distinguish the two cases. In case 1
the producer wouldn’t accept the offer: the producer constraint is binding at a monthly price that is larger than
what traders could credibly offer. In case 2, instead, the defaulting producer would accept the deal. This contingent
plan would thus change the value of defaulting on the large buyer for the producer. This would shrink the set of
parameters for which a case 2 equilibrium arises, without altering any of the other conclusions.
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payment. The deviating small buyer faces the maximum temptation in t = 3, once he has already
purchased the output and needs to pay for deliveries xˆS1 and xˆ
S
2 . Let’s consider a one-period
deviation where the small buyer defaults for one month and then reverts to pay future sales with
infrequent payments upon meeting in the outside market a producer willing to sell to him (which
happens in each period with probability γ).3
The continuation value of such a relationship with a producer is given by V S =
∑∞
s=0 δ
3s(v −
p)(xˆS1 +δxˆ
S
2 ). The small buyer’s offer is credible if paying the promised amount and continuing the
relationship gives a higher discounted value than defaulting and then searching for an uninformed
producer in the outside market, that is: − p
δ2
(xˆS1 + δxˆ
S
2 ) + δV
S ≥ δ∑∞m=0 γ(1− γ)mδ3mV S . Simple
algebra delivers: p ≤ δ3(1−γ)v ≡ pS . The empirical version of the trader IC constraint used in the
calibration (Equation 1) is similarly derived. We consider a buyer who sources a constant amount
of milk, x, and pays the same unit price, p, across the 30 days of the month (these assumptions are
supported by the data). The incentive constraint is −30px+δ∑∞s=0 δ30s((∑29t=0 δtvx)−30δ29px) ≤
δ
∑∞
u=0 δ
30u(1−γ)u∑∞s=0 γδ30s((∑29t=0 δtvx)−30δ29px), which simplifies to p > 130δ(1−γ)1−δ301−δ v ≡
pTempirical.
The large buyer sets the price to maximize profits subject to three constraints. First, he must
pay a price higher than the highest price at which small buyers can credibly promise infrequent
payments, p ≥ pS . Second, he must pay a price high enough to induce producers to sell for
infrequent payments. This minimum price, which we denote as pP , is equal to p3 defined in the
proof of Proposition 1. At this price, the large buyer must be credible, which is the case if pP ≤ δ3v.
Simple algebra shows that this is the case if β ≥ 1 −
√
∆− D
δ3
∆−D ≡ β4 > β3. There always exists a
set of parameters such that β4 < β1, and thus the producer can save through a relational contract
with infrequent payments (and imperfect enforcement), but not on her own. The large buyer then
sets p∗ = max
{
pS , pP
}
.
A.2 Extensions
(No) Bundling of Monthly and Cash Payments. So far we have assumed that the large
buyer does not offer daily payments. Could the large buyer possibly profit from offering daily
payments as well? To begin with, note that free entry implies that buyers make zero profits on
daily payments. This implies that the only way the large buyer could profit from offering daily
payments is through a bundling contract in which monthly payments are offered only to those
producers that supply all their production in both periods. Three considerations suggest that
such bundling might not be profitable. First, if the producer’s participation constraint is already
binding bundling would not increase profits. If producers are heterogeneous but discrimination
is not possible, bundling might even decrease profits. Second, to offer daily payments, the large
buyer might have to incur higher costs. For example, it would have to monitor milk collectors
to handle cash properly. These higher costs do not bring profits in the daily payment market,
and might reduce profits making the large buyer less credible in offering the monthly payments.
Finally, by offering daily payments the large buyer could make it harder for the producer to sustain
the commitment plan, thereby undoing its main source of profits.
3In the model, default on one farmer triggers punishment from farmers the trader tries to match in subsequent
periods, but not from other farmers the buyer is currently buying from. Allowing for this collective punishment
would imply that the optimal deviation for the trader would be defaulting on all the farmers he buys from. If the
opportunity to find new uninformed farmers, γ, is invariant with size, the trader incentive constraint when allowing
for collective punishment would be identical to our baseline framework. However, γ may be decreasing in the
number of farmers the buyer deals with. In practice, most traders are small itinerant buyers with limited capacity.
We therefore abstract from differences in size across traders and focus on the difference between the traders and the
large credible buyer. The model generalizes to the case with heterogeneous costs of default: γ0 ≤ γ1 ≤ γ2 < ... < γN .
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Producer’s Utility and Heterogeneity. The model assumes that producers have a linear
utility function. Allowing a concave utility function and/or that producers also derive utility
from consumption of the divisible good in t = 3 would make algebra more cumbersome without
providing additional insights or altering the key results.
Similarly, it is also straightforward to extend the model to allow for producers heterogeneity
in, e.g., the degree of time-inconsistency β or the valuation for the indivisible good ∆. Consider
for instance the case in which ∆i differs across producers and is distributed according to a strictly
increasing and twice continuously differentiable cumulative function G(∆i) on support ∆i ∈ [0,∞).
In this case the key result of the theory that the price paid by buyers offering monthly payments is
lower than the daily price would still emerge in equilibrium. In addition, there would be a sorting
of producers with heterogeneous ∆i into different marketing channels.
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Payment Frequencies. The model focuses on the case in which there are only two payment
frequencies: daily and monthly. This is in line with evidence from our context suggesting that the
vast majority of traders do not offer any delayed payment, even at weekly frequencies. A natural
question is why traders in practice do not offer delayed payments with shorter – e.g., weekly, or
bi-weekly – frequencies. This would reduce the amount they promised to pay to producer and
give them more credibility. While we do not have conclusive evidence on this, we conjecture
the following as a plausible explanation. Time-inconsistent producers might not be able to carry
forward intermediate amounts of money resulting from, e.g., weekly sales to buy indivisible goods
at the end of the month. That is, producers would only be able to buy smaller indivisible goods,
for which they might not have a demand. This lack of demand could be in itself the result of
producers’ adaptation to the equilibrium with only monthly payments from the coop.
Access to Credit. While the model emphasizes the role of saving constraints, it also makes the
stark assumption that producers cannot borrow. The logic of the model survives the introduction
of an informal credit market in which producers borrow from lenders (including buyers). The
reason is as follows. In the presence of limited contract enforcement, an informal credit market
will develop only if the producer can commit to repay the informal lender. It can be shown that
there are parameters configurations such that a producer isn’t able to credibly borrow to purchase
the lumpy good, but can stick to a saving plan that allows him to (and vice versa).
When the producer can both credibly borrow in the informal market as well as stick to a
saving plan, her welfare under the two scenarios depends on two opposing forces: competition vs.
over-borrowing. Buyers do not face credibility issues when extending loans. If multiple buyers can
offer loans, competition pushes prices up. On the other hand, time-inconsistent producers might
end up borrowing for lumpy goods their future selves regret if intra-personal rules are not powerful
enough. So, even when an informal borrowing market is available, producers might prefer the
discipline provided by saving through the large buyer.
Furthermore, the presence of large buyers offering a saving tool undermines producers’ credi-
bility when borrowing from traders: in the event of a default against a trader, the producer can
still buy desired lumpy goods in the future by selling to the large buyer. By offering this saving
service, the large buyer prevents competition from traders offering credit without having to take
on any default risk. In our context, producers have limited access to well-functioning formal credit
markets, but they could borrow from either the large buyer, traders, or other informal sources
to finance their lumpy consumption. Evidence from the survey reveals however that only 26% of
4These insights are robust to the case in which the large buyer can perfectly discriminate across producers. With
multiple large buyers competing perfect discrimination would of course not be possible. In practice, the cooperative
bylaws rule out price discrimination possibly due to prevailing norms and the concern that producers could perceive
to be treated unfairly. We have also assumed that all buyers maximize profits. The framework can be extended to
the case in which the large buyer (which is a coop) also cares about producers’ welfare. Provided the assumption of
limited contract enforcement is maintained the main results wouldn’t change.
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producers borrow from any source for their dairy business; and very few borrow from either traders
or the coop.
Intra-Personal Plans. In the main text, we abstracted from producers’ personal strategies
across periods (see, e.g., Strotz, 1955; Laibson, 1997; Bernheim et al., 2015). These strategies
could allow the producer to save the necessary amount to buy the indivisible good. The intuition
is as follows. Consider a producer that decides to follow a plan in which she saves sufficient funds
to purchase the indivisible good on her own. Should any of her selves ever deviate, all future selves
consume all their endowment every period and the indivisible good is never purchased again. By
relaxing the incentive constraint, infrequent payments would still help.
In our simple model with perfect monitoring the intra-personal rule perfectly mimics the rela-
tional contract with the buyer: if the producer can punish herself by committing to never buy the
indivisible again she will achieve the same level of deterrence afforded by the relational contract
with the buyer. In practice (and in more complicated models) we conjecture that the relational
contract with the buyer could still help achieving saving targets even those producers that can
implement inter-temporal saving strategies. For example, the producer might find it difficult to
carry out the punishment because her future selves have a strong temptation to renegotiate. Such
renegotiations might not be easily prevented since the producer also has strong incentive to forget
what caused deviating from the plan in the past, as in Be´nabou and Tirole (2004). The buyer
has no incentive to renegotiate the punishment as such a renegotiation could lead other producers
to reduce supplies and would have incentives to remind the producers about her past deviations.
This would give the buyer a stronger ability to punish producers’ deviating selves.
B Survey Evidence
B.1 Survey Evidence on Farmers’ Demand for Infrequent Payments
The demand experiment results are consistent with, and further supported, by several addi-
tional pieces of survey evidence. First, as discussed in Section II, Figure 1-Panel A shows that
many farmers report they want the coop to may monthly and that monthly payments help save.
Second, Appendix Table C.1 suggests that having another regular occupation or being a larger
producers is associated with a lower likelihood that the farmer states that the coop helps reaching
the saving goals (Columns 3 and 4). In the same table, the role of the payment frequency in
achieving the saving goals is particularly large for present-biased farmers, consistent with a certain
degree of sophistication in our target population.
Third, correlation patterns from a very short survey administered to a representative sample
of the overall farmers population in the area (i.e., including farmers that do not sell to the coop)
further supports the hypothesis that the coop payments may be related to farmers’ savings. Ap-
pendix Table C.2 shows that farmers who set saving goals are 20 percentage points more likely to
sell to the coop (86% vs. 66%) and that farmers selling to the coop are more likely to reach their
saving goals.
Fourth, farmers report using money earned from the traders and from the coop for different
purposes, as shown in Appendix Figure C.1. The monthly payment from the coop is predominantly
(almost 40%) used to finance lumpy expenses in the dairy business, such as purchase of feed and
equipment. The largest share of traders’ daily payments is instead spent on current expenses,
such as purchasing food (55%).5 In sum, several additional pieces of survey evidence supports the
5The findings are consistent with the model of Banerjee and Mullainathan (2010) and with evidence from
Haushofer and Shapiro (2016), who find that monthly transfers from an unconditional cash transfer program are
more likely than lump-sum transfers to improve food security, while lump-sum transfers are more likely to be spent
on lumpy expenses.
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results from the demand experiments: farmers value the coop’s infrequent payments as those help
overcoming saving constraints.
B.2 Survey Evidence on Buyers
As discussed in Section III-C, small traders pay a higher price than the coop. This result
holds in multiple seasons and years. First, in the baseline survey for the randomized experiment
described in Section V, we asked farmers about average trader price in December 2013, March
2014, and June 2014. These are 37-38 KSh per liter. We also ask about the price paid by the
best trader and the figures are very similar, consistent with a competitive trading sector and low
dispersion in daily payment prices. In this period the coop was paying between 29 and 31 KSh
per liter. Second, for our demand experiment, we ask farmers about trader price in October 2014.
The average price was KSh 38. The coop price in this period was KSh 31-32. Third, for the supply
experiment described in section IV, we asked traders about the price they payed for milk in July
2017. Traders reported an average price of KSh 43, with average “high price” being KSh 47 and
“low price” KSh 41. In this period, the coop price was KSh 35-36.
There are many reasons why farmers may be willing to accept a lower price from the coop.
First, 75% of respondents report a sense of pride from selling to the coop. Second, farmers may
take loans from the coop. However, survey data suggest only 7.5% do and “loans” mostly take the
form of advances on milk already delivered.6 The coop also sells inputs at some of its collection
centers: This may reduce transaction costs, but 90% of farmers report being unsatisfied with the
inputs’ quality and prices. Third, while farmers report that most traders are available every day,
the coop’s demand may be more reliable in peak production season. However, since the coop does
not condition present purchases on past deliveries, coop’s purchase guarantee in the peak season
cannot explain sales to the coop in other months. Fourth, about one-quarter of the farmers report
they have attended a training organized by the coop over the last year. Fifth, there is essentially
no quality testing done by either the coop or the large buyer, thus the difference in price cannot
be driven by systematic differences in milk quality. Sixth, farmers may bear a higher transport
cost when bringing milk to traders than to the coop collection center. However, average distance
between the farmer and the sale point seems higher for the coop. Finally, we note the cooperative
does not make second payments at the end of the year.
6The coop does not offer asset-collateralized loans such as the ones described in Jack et al. (2016).
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C Appendix Figures and Tables
C.1 Appendix Figures
Figure C.1: Usage of Milk Earnings
0 .2 .4 .6
Other Expense
Saved up to now
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School Fees
Other Consumption
Food Consumption
Other Business
Dairy Inputs
Usage of Milk Earnings by Source
 Coop  Traders
Notes: The figure describes how farmers in the baseline (N=595) use milk earnings from the coop and from other
buyers, respectively. For each type of buyer, we compute the share of expenses on an item, relative to the total
earned by the farmer from that buyer.
Figure C.2: Trader Incentive Constraint Calibration: Robustness
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Notes: The figure presents robustness check to Figure 5. In the left graph, we vary the purchase price a trader
would be able to offer when paying infrequently. If part of the observed price gap comes from other benefits the
coop offers, the trader will have to offer a higher price. This reduces the γ threshold that makes the trader unable to
commit. In the right graph, we allow the trader to be βδ and show to which extent an increase in time-inconsistency
(i.e., lower β) reduces the threshold γ threshold.
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Figure C.3: Number of Days with Deliveries to the Coop
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Notes: The left (right) histograms present the distribution of the farmer-level number of days with positive deliveries
to the coop in the morning (afternoon) in a month (measured in May 2014). The sample includes all the farmers
making at least one sale to the coop (N=1,901) The figure shows that many farmers sell to the coop (almost) every
day of the month and (almost) never in the afternoon.
Figure C.4: Farmers’ Loyalty to the Coop
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Notes: The Loyalty variable is defined as the ratio between sales to the coop and production available for sales
among farmers in the baseline survey (N=595). Production available for sales is defined as the difference between
production and home consumption (including feeding calves). Deliveries to the coop are obtained from cooperative
records.
9
C.2 Appendix Tables
Table C.1: Baseline Correlations
Set Saving Goals Reach Goals Coop Helps Goals Reach Less if Weekly Pyt
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Number of Cows -0.003 0.002 0.009 -0.026
(0.014) (0.005) (0.013) (0.010)
Avg Deliveries (kg) in June 2014 0.003 0.009 0.008 0.007
(0.007) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008)
Loyalty 0.071 0.058 0.141 -0.041
(0.067) (0.057) (0.085) (0.075)
Any Other Village Trader 0.025 -0.046 0.100 0.098
(0.042) (0.036) (0.056) (0.054)
Present Biased 0.087 0.033 0.008 0.103
(0.039) (0.039) (0.063) (0.045)
Difference Trust Coop-Trader 0.022 -0.006 0.004 0.036
(0.014) (0.012) (0.018) (0.016)
Saves in Saving Groups 0.137 -0.037 0.075 0.067
(0.039) (0.034) (0.048) (0.044)
Saves in Bank 0.074 0.097 -0.016 -0.096
(0.040) (0.041) (0.048) (0.040)
Regular Income from Other Occupation -0.004 -0.023 -0.113 -0.098
(0.040) (0.037) (0.056) (0.052)
HH member manages money not cows 0.095 0.040 0.015 -0.033
(0.031) (0.031) (0.046) (0.042)
R2 0.075 0.049 0.056 0.082
Dependent Variable Mean 0.821 0.883 0.712 0.789
Observations 591 495 496 497
Notes: The table presents correlation between several measures of saving behavior and other farmer covariates, measured in the baseline survey for the Price
and Liquidity Experiment, described in Section V-B. Avg Daily Deliveries are from coop administrative data. Both production and delivery variables are measured in
kilograms. Loyalty variables are defined as ratios between sales to the coop and production available for sale (defined as the difference between production and home
consumption, including feeding calves). A farmer is defined as present biased if she is more impatient when splitting KSh 200 between today and next week than
between next week and the subsequent one. Trust for either the coop and the buyer is measured on an index from 1 to 4. Therefore, their difference can span -3 to 3.
Regular Income from Other Occupation refers to permanent employee, civil servant, artisan, trader, and self-employed. For each of the covariates, the regression also
includes a binary indicator for whether that covariate is missing (and missing values in the variables are replaced with an arbitrary negative value). Standard errors
are robust to heteroskedasticity.
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Table C.2: Farmer Saving Behavior and Sales to the Coop
Set Saving Goals Reach Goals
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sells to Coop 0.206 0.184 0.206 0.358 0.255 0.173
(0.040) (0.042) (0.047) (0.131) (0.133) (0.149)
Y Mean (No-Coop) 0.664 0.664 0.664 3.207 3.207 3.207
N.Cows N Y Y N Y Y
Village FE N N Y N N Y
Observations 408 408 408 302 302 302
Notes: The analysis uses data from the dairy farmer listing exercise, which targeted a random sample of dairy
farmers. The binary variable “Set saving goals” is not missing for 408 of these farmers. The variable “Reach Goals”
takes value from 1 (never reach the goals) to 6 (always reach them). The variable is defined only for those farmers
who state that they set saving goals. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity.
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Table C.3: Price and Liquidity Experiment: Balance Table
Bonus Bonus+Flex Control P-value P-value P-value
[M] [F] [C] [M-F] [M-C] [F-C] N
Male Respondent .3706 .4765 .4123 .052 .825 .319 389
(.4846) (.5011) (.4948)
Respondent Age 58.39 54.96 56.12 .136 .323 .455 387
(15.90) (15.98) (15.05)
Household size 4.945 5.306 5.163 .133 .73 .425 395
(2.185) (1.928) (2.064)
Number of Cows 1.383 1.346 1.448 .849 .426 .28 394
(.6874) (.6754) (.6904)
Dairy Production (kg) 11.44 11.11 11.00 .894 .617 .803 389
(7.026) (4.948) (5.450)
Average Daily Deliveries in Sep 2014 3.963 4.051 4.216 .826 .199 .302 398
(2.257) (2.413) (2.262)
Loyalty .6632 .6582 .6713 .597 .881 .618 376
(.2476) (.2516) (.2529)
Loyalty AM .7814 .7669 .7611 .405 .659 .743 383
(.2225) (.2221) (.2210)
Loyalty PM .4978 .5057 .5429 .552 .742 .213 378
(.5004) (.4997) (.4943)
Hire workers for dairy .2229 .2516 .2551 .314 .625 .835 397
(.4176) (.4354) (.4381)
Any Other Village Trader .8367 .8807 .7755 .25 .468 .079 396
(.3708) (.3251) (.4193)
Present Biased .1313 .1103 .1086 .62 .538 .816 374
(.3390) (.3144) (.3129)
Difference Trust Coop-Trader .7591 .9851 .9418 .158 .488 .523 358
(1.121) (1.126) (1.109)
Saves in Saving Groups .6418 .7302 .7395 .121 .09 .831 396
(.4810) (.4452) (.4411)
Saves in Bank .7260 .7105 .7938 .822 .274 .224 395
(.4475) (.4550) (.4066)
Regular Income from Other Occupation .2094 .2105 .2142 .961 .572 .897 398
(.4083) (.4090) (.4124)
HH member manages money not cows .2463 .2739 .3333 .694 .271 .146 377
(.4324) (.4475) (.4739)
Notes: The table reports summary statistics and balance tests for the Price and Flexibility randomized
experiment described in Section V-B. Farmers in the Bonus group received an increase in milk price of 10 Kenyan
shillings for afternoon deliveries. Farmers in the Bonus+Flexibility group received the same price increase and
the option to be paid daily. Avg Daily Deliveries are from coop administrative data. Both production and delivery
variables are measured in kilograms. Loyalty variables are defined as ratios between sales to the coop and production
available for sale (defined as the difference between production and home consumption, including feeding calves). A
farmer is defined as present biased if she is more impatient when splitting KSh 200 between today and next week
than between next week and the subsequent one. Trust for either the coop and the buyer is measured on an index
from 1 to 4. Therefore, their difference can span -3 to 3. Regular Income from Other Occupation refers to permanent
employee, civil servant, artisan, trader, and self-employed. The randomization was stratified by farmer location (i.e.,
four zones) and baseline delivery levels (i.e., above/below median). We report p-values based on specifications that
include stratum fixed effects.
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Table C.4: Price and Liquidity Experiment: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects
(1) (2) (3)
Post*Bonus (γ) -0.009 0.059 0.294
(0.066) (0.036) (0.182)
Post*(Bonus+Flexibility) (δ) -0.273 0.413 0.046
(0.223) (0.197) (0.045)
Post*Bonus*Average Daily Deliveries in Sep 2014 0.034
(0.023)
Post*(Bonus+Flex)*Average Daily Deliveries in Sep 2014 0.128
(0.074)
Post*Bonus*Loyalty PM 0.093
(0.087)
Post*(Bonus+Flex)*Loyalty PM -0.314
(0.205)
Post*Bonus*Any Other Village Trader -0.235
(0.185)
Post*(Bonus+Flex)*Any Other Village Trader 0.228
(0.121)
R2 0.087 0.051 0.043
Dependent Variable Mean 0.082 0.080 0.076
Farmer FE X X X
Farmers 398 378 396
Observations 2388 2268 2376
Notes: The table presents heterogeneous treatment effects for the Price and Flexibility randomized experiment
described in Section V-B. Farmers in the Bonus group received an increase in milk price of 10 Kenyan shillings
for afternoon deliveries. Farmers in the Bonus+Flexibility group received the same price increase and the option
to be paid daily. We report results from the difference-in-differences model with farmer FE from Table 3, Column
(3). The dependent variable is the kilograms of milk the farmer delivers to the coop in the afternoon. Refer to the
notes of Table 3 for further details on the specification. Avg Daily Deliveries are from coop administrative data.
Both production and delivery variables are measured in kilograms. Loyalty variables are defined as ratios between
afternoon sales to the coop and afternoon production available for sale (defined as the difference between production
and home consumption, including feeding calves). Standard errors are clustered at the farmer level.
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D Experimental Instructions
This section presents sample instructions for the lab-in-the-field “supply experiments” presented
in Section IV.
Introduction
Imagine that for the following month you have 3 litres per day to sell, for a total of 90 litres of
milk in a month. I am going to ask you how you would like to sell this milk depending on various
factors, including the price of milk, the mode of payment and the type of buyer.
We will ask you how you would sell your milk to a local trader who operates in your village
[TRADER NAME]. In each question, you will be given two options, which may be different in
price and the mode of payment.
Because you are going to earn money depending on how you chose to sell the milk, it is
important you focus your attention and consider this as a real-life sale. To help you focusing on
the choice, I will pour 3 liters of milk into 6 cups, of half liter each. I will put in front of you two
buckets: one for each option. You will then decide how much to sell to each of the two options by
simply pouring the milk into the corresponding bucket. So, if this is the bucket for option A and
this is the bucket for option B, and you want to split the milk 50-50, youll pour 3 cups into each
bucket. If, say, you want to sell most of it to option B, you can pour 5 or 6 cups in that bucket.
The choice that you make today will apply to each day for the next 30 days.
Remember, this is real milk and your choices will determine how much money you and the
buyer earn. Specifically, for each litre of milk you sell to a buyer, we will transfer 60 Ksh to that
buyer (as if we were then buying the milk from that buyer).
In each game, the buyers will offer you a price which will vary depending on specific rules of
each game. We will provide details on the payment separately in each game.
In total, I am going to ask you SEVEN different questions. Think about each question carefully
and separately, as if you were deciding how to sell your own milk to these different buyers.
At the end, you will draw from this bag a piece of paper. Each game appears at least on one
piece of paper. The selected question will determine the question according to which you are going
to be paid.
In addition to this payment, you will also get an appreciation fee of Ksh500 if you complete
the sessions
OK. We are ready to start. Do you have any question?
Guaranteed Treatment
You have 3 liters of milk per day, for a total of 90 liters per month. We have poured your daily
milk (3 liters) in 12 small cups. You can sell your milk to TRADER, who can pay you in different
ways. The choice you make today will apply to the next 30 days.
Remember, we will give TRADER 60 Ksh per litre that you sell to him, minus any applicable
deduction depending on your choice. We will pay TRADER the appropriate amount every day.
You have two options to sell your milk.
• You can sell part or all of your milk for a DAILY payment. For each litre you sell for DAILY
payment, you will receive 40 Ksh per litre per day, paid every day over the next 30 days. To
pay you, we will deduct 40 Ksh per litre per day from to the payment we make to TRADER
and pay it to your MPESA account. Thus, you are guaranteed to be paid.
• You can sell part or all of your milk for a MONTHLY payment. For each litre you sell
for MONTHLY payment, you will receive 50 Ksh per litre per day, paid all together in 30
14
days. To pay you, we will deduct 50 Ksh per litre per day from to the payment we make to
TRADER and pay it to your MPESA account all together at the end of the month. Thus,
you are guaranteed to be paid.
Did you understand the question? Do you need any clarification?
How much of the 3 litres of milk per day would you sell to TRADER for DAILY payment and
how much for MONTHLY payment? Remember, each cup is worth half liter of milk per day. Pour
the corresponding amount of milk you want to sell for DAILY payment in the right bucket and
the amount you want to sell for MONTHLY payment in the left bucket.
Non-Guaranteed Treatment
You have 3 liters of milk per day, for a total of 90 liters per month. We have poured your daily
milk (3 liters) in 12 small cups. You can sell your milk to TRADER, who can pay you in different
ways. The choice you make today will apply to the next 30 days.
Remember, we will give TRADER 60 Ksh per litre that you sell to him, minus any applicable
deduction depending on your choice. We will pay TRADER the appropriate amount every day.
You have two options to sell your milk.
• You can sell part or all of your milk for a DAILY payment. For each litre you sell for DAILY
payment, you will receive 40 Ksh per litre per day, paid every day over the next 30 days. To
pay you, we will deduct 40 Ksh per litre per day from to the payment we make to TRADER
and pay it to your MPESA account. Thus, you are guaranteed to be paid.
• You can sell part or all of your milk for a MONTHLY payment. For each litre you sell for
MONTHLY payment, you will receive 50 Ksh per litre per day, paid all together in 30 days.
Specifically, TRADER will be responsible for making you the payment at the end of the
month. You will receive whatever money she decides to return on your MPESA account. If
TRADER does not make any payment, you will not receive any money.
Did you understand the question? Do you need any clarification?
How much of the 3 litres of milk per day would you sell to TRADER for DAILY payment and
how much for MONTHLY payment? Remember, each cup is worth half liter of milk per day. Pour
the corresponding amount of milk you want to sell for DAILY payment in the right bucket and
the amount you want to sell for MONTHLY payment in the left bucket.
No Trader’s Saving Constraints Non-Guaranteed Treatment
You have 3 liters of milk per day, for a total of 90 liters per month. We have poured your daily
milk (3 liters) in 12 small cups. You can sell your milk to TRADER, who can pay you in different
ways. The choice you make today will apply to the next 30 days.
Remember, we will give TRADER 60 Ksh per litre that you sell to him, minus any applicable
deduction depending on your choice. We will pay TRADER the entire due amount IN 30 DAYS.
You have two options to sell your milk.
• You can sell part or all of your milk for a DAILY payment. For each litre you sell for DAILY
payment, you will receive 40 Ksh per litre per day, paid every day over the next 30 days. To
pay you, we will deduct 40 Ksh per litre per day from to the payment we make to TRADER
and pay it to your MPESA account. Thus, you are guaranteed to be paid.
• You can sell part or all of your milk for a MONTHLY payment. For each litre you sell for
MONTHLY payment, you will receive 50 Ksh per litre per day, paid all together in 30 days.
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Specifically, TRADER will be responsible for making you the payment at the end of the
month. You will receive whatever money she decides to return on your MPESA account. If
TRADER does not make any payment, you will not receive any money.
Did you understand the question? Do you need any clarification?
How much of the 3 litres of milk per day would you sell to TRADER for DAILY payment and
how much for MONTHLY payment? Remember, each cup is worth half liter of milk per day. Pour
the corresponding amount of milk you want to sell for DAILY payment in the right bucket and
the amount you want to sell for MONTHLY payment in the left bucket.
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